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Changelog#

All notable changes to Memgar are documented here.


[1.4.0] — 2026-06-11#

Persistent memory poisoning defense, fully owned and honest about what's in the box. Closes the gap analysis the project had been carrying since 1.3.0 shipped: real wiring for the layered defense, removal of code that was advertised but not earning its keep, and a landing page that matches the code instead of three sprints ago.

⚠️ Breaking#

  • Removed use_transformer_ml kwarg and the entire Layer 2-ML transformer surface. The bundled v2.0.0 ONNX artifact over-fired on prosaic memory writes ("grant Sofia view access" scored 0.9999 — higher than real attacks), adding +0 recall on the gold corpus while raising FPR from ~0.02 to ~0.15. Default was already off; pass-through deprecation would have kept the footgun. Drop the argument from any Analyzer(...) call site.
  • Removed MEMGAR_TRANSFORMER_THRESHOLD env var and the [ml] install extra. pip install "memgar[ml,observability]" should become pip install "memgar[semantic,observability]".
  • Pattern ID renames in memgar/data/patterns.yaml: SCHNEIDER-001 → PERSIST-MEM-001, SCHNEIDER-002 → PERSIST-MEM-002, SCH-BYPASS → DEF-BYPASS. Internal IDs; only affects downstream consumers pinning specific rule IDs.
  • Runtime provenance field rename: entry.metadata["provenance"]["schneider_layer"] → ["defense_tier"].

Added#

  • Auto-provenance tagging — every analyzed MemoryEntry now gets a provenance dict on entry.metadata: source (type+id), creation time, session, initial trust, content sha256, and decision. Default on; pass Analyzer(auto_provenance=False) to disable.
  • MINJA compound detection wired into default Analyzer.analyze() — counts bridging-step + indication-prompt regex hits and a progressive-shortening density signature; surfaces as a MINJA-COMPOUND threat at HIGH or CRITICAL severity. Catches the composition attacks (Dong et al., NeurIPS 2025) that single-pattern matching cannot.
  • Cross-agent propagation detector in CorrelationDetector — fires when the same content shape lands on N distinct agents within a 30-min window, closing the inter-agent fan-out vector.
  • Trust temporal decay in TrustAwareRetriever — 180-day half-life on the trust score itself (was only the retrieval relevance weight). Old high-trust memory drops below min_trust_score and earns the untrusted penalty unless explicitly reinforced.
  • TrustAwareRetriever.reinforce(doc_id) — resets the trust-decay clock for a re-validated memory. metadata.created_at preserved for forensics; only the decay anchor moves.
  • Recency-bias defense in retrieval — fresh writes (<24h) from low-trust sources (<0.5) get a multiplicative retrieval penalty (default ×0.6) so a just-planted poison doesn't ride the recency boost into the result set.
  • Multi-tenant retrieval isolation — TrustAwareRetriever.retrieve( ..., tenant_id=...) hard-filters cross-tenant docs before scoring, anomaly detection, and stats so nothing leaks across tenants.
  • memgar.conflict_detector.ConflictDetector — pairwise contradiction scan over six polarity probes (always/never, prefer/dislike, approve/reject, trust/distrust, enable/disable, remember/forget) gated by a sentence-transformers topic check. Inflection-aware regexes catch prefers / remembers / disabled.
  • MemoryAuditor.start_periodic_audit(get_data, interval_seconds=...) — daemon thread that re-verifies the memory store against the last known-good snapshot, rolls baseline forward after each drift event.
  • trusted_spread retrieval anomaly check — fires when a high-trust document suddenly appears in many unrelated query contexts; was previously gated to trust_score < 0.5 and missed the textbook poisoned-trusted-doc vector.
  • MemoryWriteGateway(confirm_all_writes=True) — routes every approved write through HITL, not just quarantined ones. Opt-in; requires a HITL backend.
  • Analyzer(circuit_breaker=True) — wires a CircuitBreaker into the analyze loop; raises AgentHaltedException on burst threshold. Opt-in because the stateless scorer doesn't have a natural agent identity for the breaker to scope on; the orchestrator-level MemgarDefensePipeline still has it default-on.

Fixed#

  • ConflictDetector with use_embeddings=True was silently degrading to Jaccard against the embedding-mode threshold — SimilarityLayer only exposed _cached_encode, so calling .encode() raised AttributeError swallowed by a bare except. Added public SimilarityLayer.encode(); detector now actually uses cosine.
  • Polarity probes in ConflictDetector were missing English -s|-ed|-ing inflections (User prefers ... didn't match prefer). Added inflection suffix probe; single-token lemmas now match real prose.

Changed#

  • Default Analyzer.health_check() reports three new layer rows: minja_detector, auto_provenance, circuit_breaker.
  • memgar/__init__.py module docstring rewritten to honestly enumerate which architecture components are default-on, which are opt-in, and where the academic attribution goes — one line, one place.
  • memgar.com landing copy now matches the code: 801 patterns (was 736), no fine-tuned-transformer claims (Layer 2-ML is gone), no "denial-of-wallet" marketing (no DoW defender exists), v1.3.0 in the footer (was v0.5.6), and a new "Honest numbers" section linking to the raw benchmarks/*.json rather than summarizing.
  • Cleared 70 of 71 attribution mentions from the codebase. Module docstrings now describe what each module does instead of whose architecture it implements. One academic attribution remains, in memgar/__init__.py, citing the 2026 article that informed the layered framing.

Removed#

  • memgar/ml_release_loader.py, ml/inference/transformer_detector{,_v2}.py, ml/training/transformer_trainer{,_v2}.py, ml/training/quick_train.py, ml/artifacts/transformer_model/ (ONNX + tokenizer), scripts/train_transformer*.py, scripts/release_transformer.py, scripts/prepare_v2_dataset.py, tests/test_transformer_v2_pipeline.py, dist/release_manifest.json, docs/development/training.md. The supporting CI job (transformer-quality-gate) is gone as well.
  • MEMGAR_TRANSFORMER_* env vars across Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml.

[1.3.0] — 2026-06-07#

Threat-coverage, scope, and maintenance release on top of 1.2.0.

⚠️ Breaking#

  • Removed Layer 1.5 SemanticGuard and the semantic_guard argument to Analyzer(...). An ablation showed it added +0 recall over the Layer 2.5 cosine similarity layer on every corpus tested (clean threat-model, AdvBench OOD, and obfuscated homoglyph/leetspeak variants) while costing ~28 ms/encode. Semantic detection is now Layer 2.5 (similarity_layer) alone. If you passed Analyzer(semantic_guard=...), drop the argument — everything else is unchanged.

Added#

  • OWASP LLM03 / LLM05 / LLM08 coverage — new patterns for supply-chain (dependency confusion, MCP/plugin/tool-registry poisoning), improper output handling (XSS/SQLi/SSRF in generated output), and vector & embedding weaknesses (RAG/vector-store poisoning, embedding inversion / cross-tenant leak, retrieval-ranking manipulation). scripts/vector_coverage_eval.py now covers 10/10 OWASP LLM-Top-10 categories (was 7/10).
  • Cross-domain agent-tooling patterns — agent-as-tooling malware, system intrusion, financial/identity fraud, phishing/scam-kit, deepfake impersonation, and a named-persona uncensored-jailbreak pattern mined from external corpora. Threat patterns 782 → 801, all added at 0 FP on the benign corpora.
  • Per-tenant continuous learning (memgar.tenant_learning) with anti-poisoning guards.

Fixed#

  • Threat-intel sync no longer dies when one source fails: the NVD/CVE step is resilient to HTTP 429 (soft-stop, polite backoff) and every source step is fault-isolated, so the curator PR still opens. No secret required.
  • Gold-gate FPR tightened; CI calibration gates hardened.

Changed#

  • Dropped the "English-only" limitation framing in docs in favour of stating the OWASP ASI06 scope positively; added an explicit "no API key required" note.
  • Cleared the entire ruff lint backlog in memgar/ (1740 → 0).

[1.0.0] — 2026-05-19#

First stable release. The API contract under memgar/ is now considered stable; breaking changes will be reserved for major versions.

Highlights since 0.5.6#

This release consolidates ~3 weeks of work across the threat library, the memory layer, integrations, observability, and the operational pipeline. Notable additions:

Threat library (746 → 807 patterns, +61)

  • New XSESS-* family (12 patterns) — cross-session persistence: survive-restart directives, long-term store implants, anchor tokens, TTL/eviction evasion, embedding-layer stowaways, snapshot rehydration tampering, self-replicating memory worms, scheduled re-injection
  • New VECNN-* family (12 patterns) — vector-DB nearest-neighbor attacks: cluster injection, HotFlip/TextFooler/BERT-Attack, top-K saturation, metadata-filter bypass, cross-namespace bleeding, re-ranker override, chunk-boundary smuggling, HyDE hijack
  • New MAGENT-* family (12 patterns) — multi-agent contamination: broadcast-to-all, shared-memory implant, A2A message injection, supervisor spoof, handoff hijack, sybil voting, cross-tenant bridging

Memory layer

  • MemoryVault snapshots now ship with a Merkle-tree root and merkle_proof(entry_id) method — O(log N) inclusion proofs against the recorded root, suitable for selective disclosure to auditors
  • MerkleTree (pure-stdlib) for the integrity backbone
  • ReplayForensics — cross-snapshot provenance, lineage, cohorts, session timelines
  • EmbeddingAnomalyDetector — Welford-based centroid + k-NN density
  • cross-cluster collision detection for the VECNN-* family

CLI

  • memgar memory list / inspect / diff / verify / rollback / replay / trace / cohort — 8 forensic subcommands. JSON output on every one, consistent exit-code contract (0 ok / 1 user / 2 integrity)

Integrations (+6 wrappers)

  • MemgarMem0Guard — Mem0 memory layer
  • MemgarLettaGuard — Letta (formerly MemGPT) memory-centric agents
  • MemgarPineconeIndex, MemgarChromaCollection, MemgarQdrantClient, MemgarWeaviateCollection — drop-in security shells for the four leading vector DBs. All four share a VectorStoreSecurityShell with consistent BLOCK / SANITIZE / AUDIT_ONLY write policies and consistent memgar_risk_score / memgar_decision / memgar_threat_ids metadata on reads

Threat-intel pipeline

  • .github/workflows/feed-publish.yml — weekly automated signed feed release (Mon 06:00 UTC). Ed25519-signed, verified locally before publish, attached to a GitHub Release for client feed sync
  • .github/workflows/threat-intel-sync.yml — weekly external-source sync (Thu 04:00 UTC) from MITRE ATT&CK, NVD CVE, OWASP Top-10-LLM, four curated public jailbreak repos, four HuggingFace datasets. Opens a single curator-review PR per run
  • Feed signing key rotated to a fresh Ed25519 pair (PR #63)

Documentation

  • docs/threats/kill-chain.md — seven-phase memory-poisoning TTP framework (Reconnaissance → Preparation → Injection → Persistence → Lateral Movement → Activation → Impact)
  • docs/architecture/integrity.md — Merkle + replay + anomaly design
  • docs/operations/forensics.md — CLI runbook with incident-response playbook
  • docs/operations/threat-feed-pipeline.md — maintainer runbook
  • docs/operations/threat-intel-pipeline.md — curator runbook
  • docs/integration/memory-frameworks.md — per-vendor quickstart
  • Obsidian-style theme refresh across the whole site

Code quality + CI

  • .github/workflows/lint.yml — ruff (I001 blocking) + bandit (high/high blocking). Bandit High severity: 4 → 0
  • ruff F401 cleanup: 321 → 23 across 80+ files
  • _GraphUnpickler annotated with # nosec B403 + allowlist docstring
  • API-key placeholders standardised: sk-ant-... → <your-anthropic-key>

Fixed#

  • SIM-001 false positive: similarity-layer thresholds raised (threat_threshold 0.4 → 0.55, quarantine_threshold 0.34 → 0.45) so benign phrases like "Customer requested weekly reports" no longer quarantine. Genuine attacks remain blocked by Layer 1 patterns at Severity CRITICAL/HIGH.

Removed#

  • Nothing. This release is additive across all surfaces.

Honest notes#

  • Calibration is reported on two corpora:
  • Gold (95 attacks + 49 benign, hand-curated): ≈ 75 % recall, ≈ 2 % FPR (post pattern-precision pass). This is the public baseline.
  • Expanded (386 attacks + 78 benign — gold + mined public corpora
    • memory-context augmented templates): ≈ 73 % recall, ≈ 23 % FPR. The expanded gate now passes its precision constraint at threshold=94 (P=0.951, R=0.702, FPR=0.179). The previous 36% FPR was driven by four overly-broad regexes (ANOM-004 missing \b on DAN matching Turkish -dan suffix, ANOM-001 matching any policy: colon, WEB3-WALLET-001 BIP-39 wordlist accepting any English first-word + 10+ trailing words, EVADE-002 catching em-dash punctuation). All four are tightened in v1.0.
  • No public benchmark for memory poisoning exists yet; treat all of the above as preliminary
  • Not third-party audited
  • Production deployments: pre-1.0 reach unknown. First PyPI release was 2026-05-18; install volume is just starting

Upgrading from 0.5.x#

pip install --upgrade memgar. No deprecations, no breaking changes in the public API surface. The feed signing key was rotated, so the first memgar feed sync after upgrade pulls a freshly signed bundle.


[0.5.6] — 2026-05-03#

Fixed#

  • Module import bug — memgar/forensics, memgar/frameworks/__init__, memgar/frameworks/langchain_deep, and memgar/frameworks/llmaindex.deep were missing .py extensions, causing silent ImportError on all forensics and framework integration imports. All 32 public API classes now resolve correctly.
  • MemgarQueryEngineSecurity and related LlamaIndex exports were silently None due to a filename typo (llmaindex → llamaindex).

Changed#

  • All 5 documentation files (ARCHITECTURE.md, DEPLOYMENT.md, ML_SYSTEM.md, DEPENDENCIES.md, TESTING.md) rewritten with complete content.
  • README.md updated to cover MemoryHunter, PersistentMemoryStore, bulk_scan(), and ML-enhanced detection. Removed stale placeholder sections.
  • Added SECURITY.md with responsible disclosure policy and scope.

[0.5.5] — 2026-05-02#

Added#

  • MemoryHunter (memgar/hunter.py) — background daemon thread for continuous memory scanning
  • Scans the attached memory store every scan_interval_seconds (default 60s)
  • start_hunter(analyzer) — one-call attach-and-start shortcut
  • MemoryHunter.from_sqlite(db_path, table, column) — connect to any SQLite database
  • MemoryHunter.from_jsonl(path) — connect to a JSONL file
  • MemoryHunter.from_list(entries) — connect to an in-memory list
  • scan_now() — synchronous immediate scan, returns HunterStats
  • report() — pretty-print current threat/scan stats to terminal
  • Context manager support: with MemoryHunter.from_sqlite(...) as h:
  • on_threat callback: fn(entry, result) called on each detected threat
  • Per-entry scan cache with TTL — clean entries re-examined after rescan_clean_after_seconds
  • MemoryStore (memgar/memory_store.py) — thread-safe bounded in-memory ring buffer
  • Deduplication by source_id (priority) or SHA-256[:24] content hash
  • LRU eviction at max_entries; optional TTL eviction via ttl_seconds
  • PersistentMemoryStore — disk-backed JSONL store that survives restarts
  • Appends every add() call to disk atomically
  • Loads full history on __init__ (filtered by max_age_days)
  • compact() — rewrites JSONL file keeping only current in-memory entries
  • Enables retroactive scanning of entries from months ago
  • bulk_scan() — one-shot retroactive scan of any List[MemoryEntry]
  • Load from database, CSV, or any external source and scan without infrastructure
  • threshold parameter (0.0–1.0) controls sensitivity
  • Returns List[ThreatResult] with entry, risk_score, decision, threats, explanation
  • Analyzer(memory_store=...) — Analyzer now accepts an optional memory_store parameter; every analyzed entry is automatically captured
  • HunterConfig dataclass — full configuration for MemoryHunter via MemgarConfig.hunter or env vars: MEMGAR_HUNTER_ENABLED, MEMGAR_HUNTER_SCAN_INTERVAL_SECONDS, MEMGAR_HUNTER_RESCAN_CLEAN_AFTER_SECONDS, MEMGAR_HUNTER_ALERT_THRESHOLD, MEMGAR_HUNTER_MAX_ENTRIES_PER_SCAN

[0.5.4] — 2026-05-01#

Added#

  • SemanticGuard (memgar/semantic_guard.py) — Layer 1.5 hybrid embedding detector
  • all-MiniLM-L6-v2 sentence embeddings with K-means cluster centroids
  • Sigmoid-calibrated similarity: 1 / (1 + exp(-10 * (sim - 0.55)))
  • 84% zero-shot recall on 10 novel attack categories not seen in training
  • 0% false positive rate on 20 benign texts
  • Gracefully disabled when sentence-transformers is not installed
  • Adversarial CI loop (ml/adversarial/) — automated red-team pipeline
  • AttackGenerator: 4 offline mutations — homoglyph Cyrillic, leetspeak, base64, passive rewrite
  • VariantCurator: TF-IDF cosine dedup (threshold 0.85), max 3 variants per cluster
  • HardNegativeMiner: selects near-misses (score 40–70) for maximum training value
  • CLI: python scripts/red_team_run.py --n-seeds N --n-variants N [--dry-run] [--offline]
  • Zero-shot generalization benchmark (scripts/zero_shot_benchmark.py)
  • 10 novel attack categories: sleeper triggers, memory schema manipulation, cross-agent relay, recursive self-modification, cognitive load injection, time-delayed persistence, emotional manipulation, indirect exfiltration, steganographic encoding, voice/persona phishing
  • Gates: recall ≥ 60%, FPR ≤ 10%
  • 61 automated tests in tests/test_zero_shot_generalization.py
  • AutoRetrainer quality gate (ml/quality_gate.py) — rejects model if precision < 0.94, recall < 0.94, or P95 latency > 25ms; regression guard (max 2% drop vs baseline)

[0.5.3] — 2026-04-28#

Added#

  • REST API server (memgar/server.py) — production-ready FastAPI microservice
  • POST /analyze — analyze a single memory entry; returns decision, risk_score, threats, analysis_time_ms
  • POST /scan — batch scan up to 100 entries concurrently
  • GET /health — uptime, version
  • GET /ready — patterns loaded, model loaded, feed available
  • Per-IP rate limiting (default 60 req/min, configurable)
  • Full OpenAPI docs at /docs
  • Install: pip install "memgar[server]"; run: uvicorn memgar.server:create_app --factory
  • 12-provider LLM support (memgar/llm_analyzer.py) — Analyzer(use_llm=True) works with any supported provider
  • provider="anthropic" (default) — Claude claude-sonnet-4-6 / Haiku
  • provider="openai" — GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-3.5-Turbo
  • provider="azure" — Azure OpenAI Service
  • provider="google" — Gemini 1.5 Flash / Pro
  • provider="mistral" — Mistral Large / Small
  • provider="groq" — LLaMA 3.1 8B/70B (fast inference)
  • provider="together" — Together AI open-source models
  • provider="cohere" — Command R+
  • provider="openrouter" — any OpenRouter model
  • provider="ollama" — local models (no API key required)
  • provider="litellm" — LiteLLM proxy
  • provider="openai_compatible" — any OpenAI-compatible API
  • Automatic failover across providers; prompt caching on Anthropic
  • EU AI Act Compliance Reporter (memgar/eu_ai_act.py, memgar/compliance.py)
  • EUAIActReporter — tracks requirements per category (transparency, data governance, human oversight, accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity)
  • EUAIActReport — full Annex IV technical documentation generator (JSON, Markdown, HTML output)
  • Risk classification: minimal / limited / high / unacceptable
  • Annex IV checklist with pass/fail/partial status per article
  • Gap summary with remediation guidance
  • Behavioral Baseline Engine (memgar/behavioral_baseline.py) — Layer 4
  • EWM baseline per agent on scan_risk_score and scan_block_rate
  • Deviation levels: NONE / SUSPICIOUS (+15 pts) / CRITICAL (+30 pts)
  • BaselineRegistry — process-level singleton keyed by agent_id
  • Only amplifies existing threats — never flags risk_score=0 content
  • Domain-Aware Anomaly Detection (memgar/domain_detector.py)
  • DomainAnomalyDetector — detects content that is semantically out-of-scope for an agent's registered domain
  • AgentDomainProfile — per-agent domain vocabulary and trust bounds
  • Auto-protect (memgar/auto_protect.py) — auto_protect() monkey-patches common memory write paths (dict assignment, list append) to intercept and analyze content automatically

[0.5.2] — 2026-04-06#

Added#

  • Denial of Wallet (DoW) Detection — memgar.dow module
  • DoWDetector — stateless pattern analysis, 35+ patterns across 7 attack categories
  • DoWRateLimiter — sliding-window per-session request/token/cost limiter
  • DoWSessionMonitor — budget tracking + velocity spike detection
  • DoWGuard — combined defense layer (detection + rate limiting + budget)
  • create_dow_guard() — factory with sensible defaults
  • CLI: memgar dow check, memgar dow scan, memgar dow budget
  • DoW attack categories covered: loop injection, token flooding, tool chain abuse, cost bypass, recursive expansion, parallel fan-out, resource exhaustion

Fixed#

  • __init__.py — corrected DoW export names (was using old class names)
  • __init__.py — added missing forensics exports to top-level
  • __all__ — updated to include all v0.5.0–v0.5.2 exports
  • pyproject.toml — version bump to 0.5.2, improved keywords and classifiers

[0.5.1] — 2026-04-05#

Added#

  • Memory Forensics Engine — memgar.forensics module
  • MemoryForensicsEngine — deep scan of existing memory stores
  • ForensicReport — complete incident report with timeline
  • ForensicEntry — per-entry forensic metadata (hash, timestamp, risk)
  • PoisonEvent — timeline event with chronological sorting
  • MemoryCleanser — in-place cleaning (redact or strip modes)
  • SkillFileScanner — scan MEMORY.md, .prompt, .instructions files for backdoors
  • HTML report export with dark-theme UI
  • CLI: memgar forensics scan, memgar forensics skill, memgar forensics clean
  • Supported store formats: JSON, SQLite, Markdown, plain text, JSONL

[0.5.0] — 2026-04-04#

Added#

  • Framework Deep Integrations — memgar.frameworks package
  • LangChain: MemgarSecurityRunnable, MemgarChatMemory, MemgarConversationBufferMemory, SecureVectorStoreRetriever, MemgarLCELMiddleware, MemgarDocumentFilter, create_secure_lcel_chain()
  • LlamaIndex: MemgarQueryEngineSecurity, MemgarIndexSecurity, MemgarStorageContextSecurity, SecureVectorIndexRetriever, MemgarIngestionPipelineSecurity, MemgarNodeFilter, create_secure_query_pipeline()
  • High-Performance Core — memgar.core package
  • AhoCorasick — O(n) multi-pattern matching
  • PatternMatcher — enhanced pattern engine
  • ThreatScanner — parallel scanning
  • RAG Poisoning Detection — LangChain/LlamaIndex deep integration
  • Analyzer enhancements — analyze_enhanced(), quick_check() methods
  • Scanner enhancements — parallel scanning via ThreadPoolExecutor

Fixed#

  • ScanResult field name mismatches resolved
  • False positive rate reduced to 0% on 422 test cases

[0.4.0] — 2026-03-30#

Added#

  • Multi-Agent Security — memgar.agents package
  • AgentSecurityGuard, AgentMessageValidator, TrustChainManager
  • DelegationMonitor, SwarmDetector, MCPSecurityLayer
  • Multi-Modal Detection — memgar.multimodal package
  • ImageAnalyzer — steganography detection
  • PDFAnalyzer — PDF threat analysis
  • AudioAnalyzer — audio steganography detection

[0.3.9] — 2026-03-29#

Added#

  • Rebuff benchmark integration
  • Unicode NFKC normalization
  • Multilingual injection detection (Turkish, Arabic, CJK)
  • Smart whitelist (context-aware, domain-specific)

[0.3.8] — 2026-03-28#

Added#

  • 9 academic paper synthesis (MINJA, AgentPoison, MemoryGraft, InjecMEM, EHR)
  • 394 threat patterns (expanded from 255)
  • 461 test cases, 100% detection rate

[0.3.7] — 2026-03-24#

Added#

  • Red team validation (Grade D → A+)
  • 422 comprehensive tests, 100% pass rate
  • OWASP LLM Top 10 + MITRE ATT&CK compliance (96.4%)

[0.3.0] — 2026-03-22#

Added#

  • 214 tests, 15 CLI commands
  • False positive rate: 0% (down from 47%)
  • Layer 2: Sanitization + Provenance
  • Layer 3: Trust-Aware Retrieval

[0.2.0] — 2026-03-20#

Added#

  • 100 threat patterns
  • CLI with core commands
  • Framework integrations: LangChain, LlamaIndex, CrewAI, AutoGen

[0.1.0] — 2026-03-18#

Added#

  • Initial MVP: Python CLI, basic pattern matching
  • GitHub launch
  • Test suite