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Roadmap#

Public, public-issue-driven. Open a GitHub issue if you want to push something up the list.

Now (v1.0 — shipped)#

  • 4-layer pipeline (pattern · semantic · ML · trust · behavioral)
  • 770+ threat patterns including memory-context envelopes
  • Health visibility per subsystem
  • fail-close mode
  • Ed25519 signed threat feed
  • Prometheus + OCSF SIEM + OpenTelemetry
  • Two-tier CI gate (strict gold + expanded regression)
  • Corpus tier architecture
  • 8 public corpora ingested (7 default + WildJailbreak opt-in)
  • LangChain integration
  • Documentation portal at memgar.com

Next (v1.1 — Q3 2026)#

  • JavaScript / TypeScript SDK — Node and browser bindings
  • LlamaIndex integration (memgar-llamaindex)
  • AutoGen / CrewAI integration packages
  • Hosted gateway (memgar-gateway) — optional SaaS for non-Python stacks, runs the same engine via REST/gRPC
  • Production-trained transformer model distributed via signed release, opt-in via memgar.download_model()
  • Public benchmark — memgar vs Lakera Guard / NeMo Guardrails / Rebuff on PINT and our 464-sample corpus, results page on this site
  • Threat intel marketplace — community-contributed pattern packs with signature verification

Later (v1.2+ — Q4 2026 / 2027)#

  • Active learning loop — production traffic → hard negative mining → automatic retraining → canary deploy with quality gate
  • Dashboard UI — web dashboard for memgar operators (Grafana- driven or standalone Next.js)
  • VS Code extension — inline detection during agent development
  • Multi-language model support — explicit per-language pattern sets (DE, ES, FR, JA, ZH) and recall guarantees
  • Federated threat intel — secure cross-org pattern sharing
  • Cloudflare Workers / Edge runtime support
  • SOC 2 / GDPR documentation pack for enterprise deployment

Research#

Open questions we'd love help on:

  • Provenance-preserving memory writes — can we annotate every chunk in a vector store with its origin signature without breaking retrieval?
  • Behavioural baseline transfer — can baseline from one agent bootstrap a similar one without exposing PII?
  • Adversarial robustness of memory-context wrappers — what new envelopes do attackers find next?
  • Cross-modal poisoning — image / audio / video tools feeding into agent memory.

Cut from this version#

These were considered for v1.0 and explicitly postponed:

  • Pre-shipped transformer model artifact (intentional — the default training data overfits; see training docs)
  • Closed-source pattern packs
  • Auto-learned source trust
  • Telemetry phoning home

How to influence#

  1. Open a GitHub issue describing your use case.
  2. Vote with 👍 on existing issues.
  3. PR a working prototype — we'll review and merge if it fits.
  4. Join the Discord for synchronous discussion.